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EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE-MAINTAINING ACTION WHERE THE EVIDENCE MAY

AFFECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY-The plaintiff brought an action for the
breach of a contract for the manufacture of certain arming mechanisms for
the use of the United States Army. The defendant moved to dismiss the
action on the grounds that the contract in question was classified as confidential
by the army and that the disclosures of certain facts asserted to be material in
the prosecution and defense of the action would be a violation of the Federal
Espionage Laws. 1 Held, motion denied. 1be court should invoke every proper

l

}8 U.S.C. (1952) §793(a).
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judicial technique to keep state secrets unrevealed, but it should not dismiss
a valid action until the court determines that further proceedings would actually
disclose information injurious to the national security. Ticon Corp. v. Emerson
Radio & Phonograph Corp., 206 Misc. 727, 134 N. Y. S. (2d) 716 (1954).
Both the English and the American authorities are in complete agreement
that courts should not compel the disclosure of military secrets when such a
disclosure would endanger the national security.2 The consequent recognition
of a privilege for security information extends to cases where the government
is not a party to the action3 and exists irrespective of the fact that the information claimed to be secret is in the hands of a private litigant. 4 The courts, however, are not in agreement on the weight to be given an assertion of the privilege
by a government executive.5 In England an objection to evidence made by the
head of a department is conclusive on the courts of the existence of a state
secret.6 The American courts, theoretically at least, have supported a judicial
determination of the scope and existence of the privilege. 7 This theory has
largely been the result of a judicial fear of possible abuses by executive officials
if their assertions of the privilege were not subject to review or appeal. 8 It has
also been a recognition that the conflict in interests between the requirements
of national defense and the needs of private litigants can be more impartially
and effectively weighed by a court than by the very party asserting the privilege. 9
While paying lip service to a judicial determination of the scope of the privilege,
some courts have given such great weight to the executive request for secrecy
as almost to nullify the effectiveness of the judicial determination.10 While

2 Beatson v. Skene, 5 H. & N. 838, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415 (1860); Bank Line v.
United States, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 133; 32 A.L.R. (2d) 391 (1953); 58 AM.
JuR., Witnesses §535 (1948); 8 W1GMORll, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 789 (1940).
3 Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., (D.C. Pa. 1912) 199 F. 353.
4 Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 583. See also the
peculiar facts of Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), where the Court sustained
the need for secrecy on the giounds it was implied in the contract sued upon.
5 Haydock, "Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements," 61 HARv. L. REv. 468 at 472 (1948); McAllister, "Executive or Judicial Determination of Privilege of Government Documents," 41 J. CruM. L. & Cru:r.1. 330 (1950).
6 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 1 All E.R. 587, criticized in
56 HARV. L. REv. 806 (1943). See also, Stree; "State Secrets-A Comparative Study," 14
MoD. L. REv. 121 (1951).
7 Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., note 4 supra; United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1, 73 S.Ct. 528 (1953).
1
s In Mercer v. Denne, [1904] 2 Ch. 534, maps of fortifications prepared in 1647
were excluded as evidence in 1904 because such material could be held confidential by
the War Office. See also Wadeer v. East India Co., 8 DeG. M. & G. 182, 44 Eng. Rep.
360 (1856).
9 Sanford, "Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control
of Executive Departments," 3 VAND. L. REv. 73 (1949); Berger & Krash, "Government
Immunity from Discovery," 59 YALE L.J. 1451 (1950); 36 GEo. L.J. 656 (1948).
10 United States v. Haugen, (D.C. Wash. 1944) 58 F. Supp. 436. This has led some
writers to conclude that the American cases follow the English rule. 36 GEo. L.J. 656 at
657 (1948).
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both constitutional11 and statutory12 rationalizations have been offered for this
judicial deference to the executive, perhaps the best explanation lies in the
unwillingness of the courts to test their powers of enforcement against the
executive. 13 These arguments are likely to be discarded, however, in favor
of public policy considerations when, as in the principal case, the information is
already in the hands of a private litigant and the state is not a party to the
action. One of the considerations most likely to influence the court to allow
the executive to maintain the privilege is the danger of public exposure of
the secret during the public hearings necessary to a court determination. 14
Another argument is the desirability of having the decision made by a technically
trained executive expert.15 Even more important, however, is the basic realization of the courts that some secrets must be kept secret perhaps even from
the court itself, and regardless of the injury to the private litigant. With this
in mind, the primary function of the court may not be an independent investigation of the evidence claimed to be privileged,16 but rather the creation
of a judicial climate in which the exercise of the privilege by the executive
would be so difficult both procedurally and substantively that abuse would not
be worthwhile. That this is the rationale of the courts is becoming increasingly
evident. Under this theory the courts ,vill limit the privilege to the government itself, 17 refuse to recognize the mere classification of secrets as an assertion
of the privilege,18 and require in court the presence of a high department official
to assert the objection to the evidence. 19 Requirements such as these can largely
eliminate the ordinary abuse of the privilege caused by the lethargy, indiffer11

This argument holds that to force the executive to give up records or papers would

be a breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Hartranft's Appeal, 85
Pa. 433 (1877). But this argument may be applicable only to the chief executive of the
state or nation. United States ,,. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Cas. 55, No. 14,694e.
See also 51 CoL. L. REv. 881 (1950).
12 By the authority of Rev. Stat. §161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §22, each department
head may " ... prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for . . . the custody, use,
and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it." The contested
phrase, of course, is "not inconsistent with law." See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459,
20 S.Ct. 701 (1900).
13 For a discussion of the problem of sovereign immunity, see 65 HARv. L. REv. 466
(1952) and 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 1167 (1950).
14 But statutory authority for closed hearings in civil cases may be inferred from the
statutory prohibitions of the publication of restricted data. Haydock, "Some Evidentiary
Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements," 61 HARv. L. REv. 468 at 483
(1948).
15 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 519 (1952); 19 TENN. L. REv. 477 (1946).
16 Most authors have proposed various ways of allowing the court to examine the
evidence in secret to determine the merits of the objection to its admission. See, e.g., the
articles cited in note 5 supra.
17 Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., note 3 supra; In re Grove, (3d
Cir. 1910) 180 F. 62. But the privilege may also be exercised by the court itself in the
absence of an objection by the government. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., note 6 supra.
See also A.L.I. MoDEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE, rule 227 (1942).
18 "It is not a sufficient ground that the documents are 'State documents' or 'official'
or are marked 'confidential.' " Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., note 6 supra, at 642.
10 United States v. Reynolds, note 7 supra.
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ence and lack of initiative of executive officials.2 Calculated abuse of the
privilege will be made more difficult by placing on the government the burden
of showing affirmatively the need for secrecy in the interest of national security.
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that the amount of proof
the government must show to sustain the objection is directly proportionate
to the private litigant's need for the evidence in order to prove his claim or
defense.21 Such rigorous procedural and substantive requirements will cause
a real evaluation by the executive of the relative advantage of asserting the
privilege, and may limit its use to the most necessary cases. In this way the
issue of executive versus judicial control of the privilege may be avoided entirely. This seems to be the result of the principal case.

John F. Dodge, Jr., S.Ed.

2 0 For a discussion of this type of executive abuse, see 8
ed., 792 (1940).
21 United States v. Reynolds, note 7 supra.

WmMoRE, EVIDENCE,

~d

